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Temporal Dimension of 
Reproductive Choice and 
Human Rights Issues1
Dragan Dakić
Purpose:
The purpose of this investigation is to contribute to better understanding 
of the scope of positive obligations in safeguarding specific rights related to 
reproduction. The first aim of the research is to determine the States’ obligations 
in respect of an abortion surviving child. These obligations arise from the right to 
life and the prohibition on inhuman treatment. The second aim is to determine the 
effects of temporal constraints to reproductive choice on the Conventional rights 
of a pregnant woman. This refers to the right to privacy.
Design/Methods/Approach:
Spelled objectives are mostly achieved through the case-law study method. 
Also, we have used a method of comparison – between exclusive and inclusive 
theoretical approaches to the issue. We have approached to the topic from the 
utilitarian positions. The scope of this research is limited only to the margins of 
the mother-foetal conflict.
Findings:
The main findings could be summarized as follows: the States’ positive 
obligations require providing medical care to the surviving child. Simultaneously, 
the temporal constraints to accessing the negative aspect of reproductive choice 
require the States to provide timely information to a woman. Thus, she can decide 
about terminating her pregnancy.
Originality/Value:
The conclusions may contribute to domestic thought, which mostly relies on 
defect utilitarian calculations when discussing the issues. The judicial bodies may 
benefit from this research since it highlights which measures should be imposed 
upon a handling practitioner. The medical stuff is provided with guidance on 
how to face a situation when it is overlooked in legislation.
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Časovna komponenta reproduktivne izbire ter vprašanje 
človekovih pravic
Namen prispevka:
Namen prispevka je prispevati k boljšemu razumevanju pozitivnih dolžnosti 
pri varovanju posebnih pravic, povezanih z reprodukcijo. Prvi cilj raziskave je 
ugotoviti dolžnosti države pri pozni prekinitvi nosečnosti, kjer glede na različne 
metode prekinitve obstaja možnost, da otrok prekinitev nosečnosti preživi. 
Obveznosti držav članic Sveta Evrope do takega otroka se obravnavajo v sklopu 
pozitivnih dolžnosti, ki bremenijo države v okviru pravice do življenja in 
prepovedi nehumanega in ponižujočega ravnanja. Drugi cilj je ugotoviti učinke 
časovnih omejitev reproduktivne izbire na osnovi konvencijskih pravic nosečnic, 
ki so zaščitene v okviru pravice do zasebnega življenja.
Metode: 
Navedeni cilji so v večini doseženi preko študije primerov. Uporabili smo 
metodo primerjave med izključujočimi in vključujočimi teoretičnimi pristopi k 
temu vprašanju. Pri analizi smo uporabili utilitaristični pristop. Cilj te raziskave je 
omejen le na mejno področje odnosa mati – zarodek.
Ugotovitve:
Glavne ugotovitve raziskave so naslednje: pozitivne dolžnosti države 
zahtevajo zagotovitev zdravstvene oskrbe za otroke, ki preživijo prekinitev 
nosečnosti, hkrati pa časovna omejitev pristopa k splavu nalaga državi obveznost, 
da nosečnici pravočasno zagotovi ustrezne informacije, na podlagi katerih se bo 
odločila o prekinitvi nosečnosti.  
Praktična uporabnost:
Sklepi lahko prispevajo k oblikovanju domačih mnenj, ki večinoma temeljijo 
na napačnih utilitarističnih predpostavkah pri obravnavi teh vprašanj. Raziskava 
je lahko uporabna tudi za pravosodne organe, saj izpostavlja ukrepe, ki bi morali 
biti uvedeni zoper odgovorne zdravnike. Medicinsko osebje se lahko v prispevku 
seznani z navodili, kako ukrepati v primerih, ki so spregledani v zakonodaji.
UDK: 342.7
Ključne besede: reproduktivna izbira/pravica, časovna omejitev, pravica do 
življenja, kazenska odgovornost, zasebno življenje
1 INTRODUCTION
For the purpose of this article, the phrase ‘reproductive choice’ refers to its negative 
aspect, i.e., the access to pregnancy interruption. Also, this phrase has been used 
by the Conventional institutions, the former Commission for Human Rights and 
now European Court of Human Rights. The European Court of Human Rights 
(hereinafter: the Court) has used this phrase mostly when deciding on relations 
between abortion and human rights safeguarded through European Convention 
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950; hereinafter: the Convention). 
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In order to explore temporal constraints to reproductive choice and human 
rights consequences, which have arisen from it, we address its main features in 
the first section of the article. This section is divided into two subsections. The 
first subsection addresses the legal background of a temporal dimension of 
reproductive choice. It is done through the analysis of historical developments of 
two different European national legislations, which represent essentially opposite 
approaches to the issue of the right to life beginning. Current national standings 
on temporal constraints are presented in the second subsection. Further discussion 
in this subsection presents the impact of national standings on regional human 
rights approach. Through recapitulation of case law, the concluding remarks in 
this section are about the temporal frameworks of reproductive choice, which 
is recognized by the Conventional institutions as compliant with human right 
guarantees.
The second section discusses one of the most controversial questions 
concerning temporal dimension of reproductive choice. It investigates human 
right requirements in regard to an empirical consequence of the extensions of 
temporal framework. It should be borne in mind that neither this section nor 
the article as a whole addresses legitimacy of late termination of pregnancy or 
legitimacy of temporal constrains. Special attention is given to the analysis of 
general right to life requirements regarding the abortion surviving child. Our 
starting point considers the issue whether the right to life guarantees is applicable 
on such a child, and if it is, whether all Council of Europe Member States 
(hereinafter: the States) have obligations to provide life-sustaining treatment or 
medical care to this child. Furthermore, it considers the obligation of the States to 
enforce judicial mechanisms against (handling) medical professionals who fail to 
do so. In order to determinate whether such a child is entitled for human rights 
protection, the article discusses on his/her Conventional status, which is afforded 
to him/her through case law. The consequences of this status are addressed in 
proceedings. Simultaneously, it is discussed whether such consequences are just 
theoretical ones taking into account the procedural requirements of human right 
mechanisms.
The third section addresses the effects of temporal dimension of reproductive 
choice on the private life of a pregnant woman. Temporal constraints unequivocally 
affect a scope of her reproductive choice denying her access to legal abortion. From 
the other hand, temporal constraints safeguard her health as late termination of 
pregnancy imposes considerable risk to it. Thereof, the primary object in this 
discussion is whether the States which permit termination of pregnancy maintain 
fair balance between the private life of the pregnant woman on one hand and public 
interest in maternal health safeguarding on the other hand. National practices in 
resolving such conflicts have been examined by the Conventional institutions in 
the cases concerning timely information on mothers’ entitlement for therapeutic 
abortion or foetus’s condition in the light of temporal constrains of reproductive 
choice. Through the recapitulation of relevant case law, we have allocated certain 
general human rights requirements, which safeguard reproductive choice when 
national legislation allows abortion access and imposes temporal restrictions to 
it. Close to this subject is the question of informed consent, which is not going to 
be addressed on this occasion. Instead, our focus will remain on timely, full and 
reliable information as one of its aspects. 
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2 TEMPORAL DIMENSION OF REPRODUCTIVE CHOICE
2.1 Legal Background
The European approach to reproductive choice is partly determined with its 
historical course, which can be described as ranging from criminalization of 
abortion to arising reproductive rights. In proceedings, we are going to briefly 
address legal evolution, which has occurred in statutory regulation of two major 
European legal schools in regard to the negative aspect of reproductive choice, 
which refers to abortion. First, we are going to review the developments in England 
law, which is the leading example of European liberal approach. On the other 
hand, we choose to explore the historical roots of German legal approach, which 
is, considering the current legal framework especially in the field of biomedicine, 
known as one of the most restrictive regimes in Europe.
The first references to abortion in English law appeared in the 13th century 
(Wakley, 2007). The law followed religious standings that abortion was 
acceptable until ‘quickening’, i.e., till the soul entered the body (Eser, 1986). The 
legal situation remained constant for centuries. In 1803, the Ellenborough Act 
prescribed that abortion after ‘quickening’ (16–20 weeks) should be sanctioned 
with capital punishment (Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Ireland, 1803). Previously, the punishment had been less severe. In the 1837, this 
Act was amended to remove the distinction between the abortion before and after 
quickening. Offences against the Person Act (Parliament of the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Ireland, 1861) performing an abortion or trying to self-abort 
carried a sentence of life imprisonment. Infant Life Preservation Act adopted in 
1929 introduced a new crime of killing a viable foetus (at that time fixed at 28 
weeks) in all cases except when the woman’s life was at risk (British Parliamentary, 
1929). This Act was at force till Abortion Act (British Parliamentary, 1967), which 
legalized the abortion under certain conditions. It allows an abortion on demand 
till 24th week of pregnancy and certain grounds for late-term abortion. In 1990, 
the Human Fertilization and Embryology Act introduced controls over new 
techniques, which had been developed to help infertile couples and to monitor 
experiments on embryos (British Parliamentary, 1990). The 1990 Act lowered the 
legal time limit from 28 to 24 weeks, which is the currently accepted point of 
viability. It also clarified the circumstances (grounds) under which abortion could 
be obtained at a later stage.
The first German native act regulating abortion was the Constitutio Criminalis 
Carolina of 1532 (effective in some parts of Germany until the mid-nineteenth 
century). The Constitutio Criminalis Carolina as well as certain criminal codes 
of various German states punished abortion less severely in the first half of 
pregnancy than in the second (Eser, 1986). Certain German states did not punish 
the former at all. From the middle of the nineteenth century the German states 
considered abortion to be an independent crime distinguishable from the killing 
of born life (Berner, 1900). The highest German court in decision from 1927 
considered abortion as an ‘extra-statutory necessity’ when it was performed in end 
to secure the pregnant woman’s life and health. Further analysis of national case 
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law envisages that legalizing abortion during the first three months of pregnancy 
was considered for incompatible with the constitutionally guaranteed right to 
life of the foetus. On the other hand, in attempt to regulate time laps between 
procreation and pregnancy and prevent misuse of artificially created embryos, 
the Law for Protecting Embryos (ESchG) was passed to protect embryos in vitro 
from the moment of fertilization, providing prenatal life with wider scope of the 
protection, from the moment prior the law rendering abortions illegal recognizes 
that pregnancy has begun (Karnein, 2012).
2.2 Current National Positions and Regional Approach
At national level temporal dimension of reproductive choice is still covered by 
a prohibition against unlawful termination of pregnancy sanctioned through 
criminal law. Different criteria, which qualify pregnancy termination as lawful 
or unlawful are mostly reduced on procedural requirements which should be 
fulfilled at certain gestational age. For instance, in the Western Balkan countries, 
self-termination of pregnancy is not criminalized whenever it occurs, even in 
situation when it is not permissible, considering temporal limitations. There are 
opinions that grounds for such an approach are determined by considerations for 
women’s health – stimulating them to look for a professional help in case of health 
complications (Lazarević, 1983). A quite opposite approach is taken in Germany 
(German Criminal Code, 1998), which introduces punishment of imprisonment 
if a crime (of unlawful termination of pregnancy) was committed by a woman. 
The grounds for the latter approach could be also found in the consideration 
for women’s health. It stimulates women to practice safe and lawful methods of 
pregnancy termination and to avoid health complications. The former approach 
facilitates health consequences while the latter apparently prevents them.
Considering protection of the positive aspect of reproductive choice by means 
of criminal law, we might consider that European legislators were negligent to it. 
Legislation of the most Council of Europe Member States does not extend offence 
of unintentional homicide to the foetus regardless of its gestational stage. Unlike 
this general feature of the most European legislations, there are three countries, 
which have created specific offences.2 In Italy a person negligently causing a 
pregnancy to terminate is liable to a prison sentence of between three months 
and two years under section 17 of the Abortion Act of 22 May 1978 (British 
Parliamentary, 1978). In Spain Article 157 of the Spanish Criminal Code (1995) 
makes it a criminal offence to cause damage to the foetus and Article 146 an 
offence to cause an abortion through gross negligence. In Turkey Article 456 of 
the Turkish Criminal Code (2004) lays down that a person who causes damage 
to another shall be liable to a prison sentence of between six months and one 
year; if the victim is a pregnant woman and the damage results in premature 
birth, the Criminal Code prescribes a sentence of between two and five years’ 
imprisonment. French criminal law recognizes that if, as a result of unintentional 
negligence, a mother gives birth to a live child who dies shortly after being born, 
2 See Vo v France Application No 17004/90, Merits, 8 July 2004, para 41.
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the person responsible for it may be convicted of the unintentional homicide of 
the child.3 
In regard to the negative aspect of reproductive choice, European national 
statutory regulation is divided into two broadly drawn concepts. There are 
the States with a restrictive approach to abortion and the States with a liberal 
legislation.4 In most of the States the law permits abortion in order to save the 
expectant mother’s life. Abortion is available on request (according to certain 
criteria including gestational limits) in some 30 States. Abortion on health grounds 
is available in some 40 Contracting States, while on well-being grounds in some 35 
of them. Three States prohibit abortion in all circumstances (Andorra, Malta and 
San Marino). In recent years, certain States have extended the grounds on which 
abortion can be obtained (Monaco, Montenegro, Portugal, Spain and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina/Republic of Srpska), while two States reduced them (Hungary and 
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia). Ireland adopted legislation, which 
enables women to obtain abortion in certain situations.
Such legal background affected regional human right approach to the 
negative aspect of reproductive choice. Apparently, the issue of prenatal life 
protection has not been resolved within the majority of the States themselves 
and there is no European consensus on the scientific and legal definition of the 
beginning of life. Thereof, whenever the questions of relations between human 
right guarantees and abortion have been invoked before the Court, it stated that 
the issue of determining the moment when the protection of right to life began 
had come within the States’ margin of appreciation. However, the Court noted 
that most States had had in their legislation resolved the conflicting rights of the 
foetus and mother in favour of a greater access to abortion. This also refers to 
wider temporal frameworks of abortion permissibility.
Convention institutions have found that abortion is compliant to human 
right guarantees when it occurs in the initial stage of pregnancy on the grounds 
of medical indication and/or well-being reasons. Such provisions are, from the 
Conventional point, legitimizing for interference into other parties’ conflicted 
rights and according to Court’s opinion taken in the Boso v Italy,5 they strike a 
fair balance between, on the one hand, the need to ensure protection of the foetus 
and, on the other, the woman’s interests. In this light, some considers that if 
the State permits temporally unlimited abortions it would breach Conventional 
guarantees (O’Donovan, 2006). In their case law, Convention institutions 
do not determinate the exact duration of the initial stage of pregnancy. The 
conclusion could be reached through a recapitulation of the relevant case law. 
In the Paton case6 in which temporal parameter was applied for the first time, the 
termination of pregnancy occurred approximately at 10th week of gestation. In the 
aforementioned Boso v Italy, the precise information when termination occurred 
was not presented to the Court. It was concluded according to the procedural 
3 See Vo v France Application No 17004/90, Merits, 8 July 2004, para 83.
4 For the European laws review refer to A, B and C v Ireland, Application No 25579/05, Merits, 16 December 
2010 para 112.
5 Boso v Italy, Application No 50490/99, Merits 5 September 2002.
6 See Paton v United Kingdom, Application No 8416/78, Decision of the Commission 1980at para 2–4.
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provisions of the national legislation to have been happened during the first 
twelve weeks. In R. H. v Norway the abortion occurred between 12th and 18th week 
of pregnancy. Therefore, we could conclude that the relevant case law indicates 
that first 18 weeks comes within the initial stage of pregnancy. In the following 
discussion, we will be considering the temporal dimension of reproductive choice 
and how it bears significant legal consequences. It affects the guarantees inherent 
in Article 2, Article 3 and Article 8 of the Convention (1950).
3 LATE TERMINATION OF PREGNANCY AND RIGHT TO LIFE 
PROTECTION
In the previous subsection, we were trying to determine the duration of the initial 
stage of pregnancy. It is, according to Conventional institutions, ‘safe zone’ for 
operation of medical indication and/or well-being reasons as abortion grounds. 
Since it is not defined at regional scale when the right to life begins, there is no 
strict parameter in defining the meaning of ‘late termination of pregnancy’. It 
could mean the termination following the initial stage of pregnancy or any other 
provisory moment. For the purpose of further discussion, ‘late termination of 
pregnancy’ means the interruption of pregnancy after the point that the foetus 
becomes viable. From this point, it is quite possible that the child survives 
pregnancy interruption. Most techniques of late termination of pregnancy are 
similar to the procedure of medically induced labour. The difference between 
those two procedures is in their purposes; the former aims to deliver the life, 
while the latter does not (Mujović-Zorić, 2009). The human right issues which 
arise here relates the States’ obligation to provide life-sustaining treatment or 
medical care for those who survive abortion, legal accountability of handling 
medical professional (Wicks, Wyldes, & Kilby, 2004), and even the purpose of 
abortion itself. 
The obligation of the States to provide life-sustaining treatment or medical 
care could arise of Article 2 of the Convention (1950), which reads:
1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived 
of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his 
conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law. 
2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of 
this Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely 
necessary: 
(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; 
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person 
lawfully detained;
(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.
According to Conventional institutions, right to life cannot be derogated,7 
7 McCann and others v The United Kingdom, Application No 18984/91, Merits, 27 September 1995, para 147; 
Soering v The United Kingdom, Application No 14038/88, Merits, 07 July1989, para 88; Cruz Varas and others 
v Sweden, Application No 15576/89, Merits, 20 March1991, para 99; Orhan v Turkey, Application No 25656/94, 
Merits, 18 June 2002, para 325; Ipekv Turkey, Application No 25760/94, Merits, 17 February 2004, para 
163; Imakayeva v Russia, Application No 7615/02, Merits, 09. November 2006, para 139; Timurtas v Turkey, 
Application No 23531/94, Merits, 13. June 2000, para 82-83; Velikova v Bulgaria, Application No 41488/98, 
Merits, 18 May 2000, para 68; Makaratzis v Greece, Application No 50385/99, Merits, 20 December 2004, para 
56; Esmukhambetov and others v Russia, Application No 23445/03, Merits, 29 March 2011, para 138.
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except in the circumstances expressly listed in paragraph 2 of Article 2.8 General 
positive obligations introduced in Article 2 require from the States to take 
appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction.9 This 
provision requires the States not only to refrain from the ‘intentional’ taking of 
life, but also to take positive measures to safeguard those within its jurisdiction.10 
In certain circumstances, it may also imply a positive obligation on the authorities 
to take preventive operational measures to protect an individual whose life is at 
risk.11 Also, in the field of medical care, positive obligations require the States to 
make regulations which compel hospitals, whether private or public, to adopt 
the appropriate measures for the protection of patients’ lives.12 They also require 
an effective independent judicial system to be set up so that the cause of death 
of patients in the care of the medical profession could be determined and those 
responsible made accountable.13
Therefore, the failure of the State to adopt and enforce life-saving procedures 
in the case when a child survives the abortion, and to enforce judicial proceedings 
against responsible, could constitute the breach of Article 2 of the Convention 
(1950).14 In order to examine the applicability of general guarantees on the 
surviving children, we must first determine their Conventional status. First, we 
should bear in mind that the Court has recognized these embryos, which are not 
viable in the sense such as foetuses, as the members of the human race. It is an 
important recognition as being a human is inextricably connected to human rights 
protection. As members of the human race, embryos and foetuses are entitled to 
human rights protection to the certain extent. Second, Conventional institutions 
have found that the unborn child’s right to life is subject to implied limitations. 
When reasoning on the constraints to its right to life, then the existed Commission 
stated that ‘protecting the life and health of the woman “at that stage, of the right 
to life” of the foetus’ justifies termination. Because of the applied graduation of 
right to life protection depending on gestation, it could be considered that the 
scope of right to life protection grows with foetus while the implied limitations 
are being reduced. Third, from the age of Paton case Conventional institutions 
have separated recognition of legal status from right to life protection (Wicks, 
2011). Although the recognition of the legal status of a person in the moment of 
8 Esmukhambetov and others v Russia, Application No 23445/03, Merits, 29 March 2011, para 138.
9 L.C.B. v the United Kingdom, Merits, 9 June 1998, Reports of Merits, s and Decisions 1998-III, p. 1403, 
para 36. In regard to protection against third parties offences see: Osman v the UK, Application No 
23452/94 Merits, 18 October 1998, par 115; Mahmut Kaya v Turkey, Application No 22535/93, Merits, 
28/03/2000, par 85; Akkoç v Turkey, Application No 22947/93, Merits, 10 October 2000, par 71; Kiliç v 
Turkey, Application No 22492/93, Merits, 28 March 2000, par 62; Oneryildiz v Turkey, Application No 
48939/99, Merits, 30 November 2004, par 89.
10 L.C.B. v the United Kingdom, supra n 18, Association X v the United Kingdom, Application No 7154/75, 
Decision of 1979, Decisions and Reports 14, pp 31. 
11 Osman v the UK, Application No 23452/94 Merits, 18 October 1998 para 115, and Keenan v the United 
Kingdom, Application No 27229/95, ECHR 2001-III.
12 Trocellier v France (dec.), Application No 75725/01, para 4, ECHR 2006-XIV
13 Powell v the United Kingdom (dec.), , Application No 45305/99, ECHR 2000-V
14 About required judicial response on infringement of new-born patient’s lives refer to Calvelli i Ciglio v Italy, 
Application No 32967/96, Merits, 17. 01. 2002 par 50–57. 
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his or her birth is common European legal standard (Enders, 2010), it does not 
necessarily restrict the legal protection afforded to human beings in prenatal 
stage.15 Therefore, if some argue that such child cannot be recognized as a 
person before law for whatsoever reasons, it cannot affect its entitlement for 
human rights protection. Fourth, as potential moments for beginning of right 
to life protection, Conventional institutions marked: conception, nidation, point 
that the foetus becomes ‘viable’ or live birth.16 There is considerable academic 
support for position that right to life is applicable when the foetus reaches the 
point of viability. According to Wicks, foetus has right to life from this moment, 
which requires right to life protection (Wicks, 2010). It follows that regardless of 
the employed means or length of gestation, live birth is the last moment for the 
beginning of right to life protection afforded to ‘everyone’. 
Considering Conventional status afforded to prenatal life, it may be 
concluded that the abortion surviving child is entitled for Conventional 
protection. Without regard for the question whether labour was induced at 6th or 
9,5th month of gestation or it occurred naturally, from the moment of live birth, 
life becomes universally and regionally profound value. From that moment, the 
States’ have positive obligation to preserve it by any reasonable means, which 
cannot be derogated by private,17 or/and professional interests (Heywood, 2012). 
From that moment human life certainly steps out the scope of ‘limited’ right to 
life protection afforded to the initial stage (in uterus) foetus. Thereof, no matter 
on which grounds abortion (pregnancy termination) occurs, initiating reasons 
cannot be applied to termination of new born life. Even more, the purpose of the 
pregnancy termination cannot be to kill foetus, which is hardly justified under the 
human rights. The purpose of the pregnancy termination could be only to remove 
foetus from the uterus (Thomson, 1971).
Now, after the conclusion that the surviving child is entitled for Conventional 
protection, we should address human rights safeguards of its inviolability. 
Although the Court has yet to determine the issue of the ‘beginning’ of ‘everyone’s 
right to life’ within the meaning of Article 2 of the Convention (1950) provisions 
(Mowbray, 2005), the infringement in this case could be qualified as manslaughter 
or even as homicide. Because of that, mere civil-law remedies could not satisfy 
requirements of Article 2 of the Convention (1950), even though the infringement 
occurs by means of omission. The infringement of the right to life or to personal 
integrity caused by means of omission in the field of health care could not stay 
immune on this requirement.18 Moreover, it cannot be excluded that acts and 
omissions on the part of the authorities in the field of health-care may engage 
15 German Federal Constitutional Court, February 25, 1975 (BVerfGE 39, 1) and May 28, 1993 (BVerfGE 88, 
203).
16 Paton v United Kingdom, supra n 13 at para 12.
17 In Sommerfeld v. Germany [GC],No. 31871/96, ECHR 2003-VIII, para 66, Görgülü v. Germany, No. 
74969/01, 26 February 2004, para 43; and Ahrens v. Germany, No. 45071/09, 22 March 2012, para 63, the 
Court recognized that depending on their nature and seriousness, the child’s best interests may override that 
of the parents.
18 See Anguelova v Bulgaria, Application No 38361/97, Merits, 13 June 2002 and Velikova v Bulgaria, 
Application No 41488/98, Merits, 18 May 2000.
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their responsibility also under Article 3 of the Convention (1950),19 even when 
the purpose of omission was not intended to humiliate or debase the surviving 
new-born. Although the purpose of treatment is a factor to be taken into account 
when deciding whether it falls within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention 
(1950), the absence of any such purpose does not inevitably lead to a finding that 
there has been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention (1950).20 Apparently, 
denial of medical care to those children stands against both, Article 2 of the 
Convention (1950),21 and Article 3 of the Convention (1950),22 guarantees. Bearing 
in mind that existing human rights norms protect human dignity from the earlier 
stages of life23 till the dying stage (Wicks, 2010), it would be truly hard to justify 
denial of at least medical care, which is the most naturally expected and which in 
the most cases bears a significant benefit potential. 
But, the practice in the States seems to be negligent over those requirements. 
In the States where late termination of pregnancy is allowed, hospitals are 
practicing the so-called comfort care, a sort of nonmedical treatment to surviving 
new-borns. This treatment includes leaving these children to die of dehydration 
or hunger, deprived of any medical care meanwhile (Mujović-Zorić, 2009). This 
practice is challenged under the collective complaint before European Comity 
for Social Rights, and the outcome in this procedure is going to unequivocally 
impact standings on this practice in Europe. There is one fact, which in this regard 
makes Convention (1950) guarantees and rights close to theoretical and illusory, 
distant from practical and effective as they should be.24 That fact stares out of the 
procedural requirements for starting the Strasbourg machinery i.e. in the power to 
invoke application before the Court in behalf of those children. If there is parental 
consent to abortion and following comfort care procedure, in reality those children 
are completely excluded from the Conventional protection (CF to Congress of 
the United States of America, 2002). There are considerations that the approach 
should be extended to children born alive with no temporal limitations (Giubilini 
& Minerva, 2012). In future, this practice could be challenged before the Court 
probably by the non-consent parent. Depending on judicial outcome, the Court is 
going to support for the growing scope of children rights and their autonomy, or 
introduce the renaissance of Romans’ jus vitae ac necis. In the comparative law, even 
the techniques of pregnancy termination were legislatively referred in the light of 
unborn life protection (Steinbock, 2011). The Supreme Court of USA upheld the 
ban on so called partial birth abortion, considering that even when abortion is 
legal, not every method is acceptable: “the State may use its regulatory power to 
bar certain procedures and substitute others, all in furtherance of its legitimate 
interests in regulating the medical profession in order to promote respect for life, 
including life of the unborn.”25
19 See, for example, Powell v the United Kingdom Application No 45305/99, ECHR 2000-V, İlhan v Turkey 
[GC], Application No 22277/93, para 87, ECHR 2000-VII. Paragraph 1 of Article 3 reads: No one shall be 
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
20 P. and S. v Poland, Application No 57375/08, Merits, 30 October2012par 160.
21 Cyprus v Turkey, Application No 25781/94, Merits, 10 May 2001.
22 D v United Kingdom, Application No 30240/96, Merits, 2 May 1997.
23 Vo v Francesupra n 3 para 84.
24 See Airey v Ireland, 9 October 1979, para 24, Series A Application No 32.
25 Gonzales, Attorney General v Carhart etal. Application No 05-380, 18 April 2007 
Dragan Dakić
162
4 TEMPORAL DIMENSION OF REPRODUCTIVE CHOICE AND 
MOTHER’S RIGHTS
Temporal dimension of reproductive rights does not necessarily have restrictive 
effects on the rights and interests of a pregnant woman. In fact, it imposes 
demanding obligations on the States’ side. For instance, it requires law to provide 
effective procedural mechanisms capable for determining whether the conditions 
existing for obtaining a lawful abortion on the grounds of danger to the mother’s 
health26, or of addressing the mother’s fears on condition of foetus.27 It also requires 
timely information to be obtained.28 In Tysiąc v Poland29 there were indications 
that delivery might endanger the applicant’s health. Previously, Conventional 
institutions had considered that the establishment of any such relevant risk to a 
woman’s life caused by her pregnancy clearly concerned fundamental values and 
essential aspects of her right to respect for her private life.30 Therefore, having regard 
to the particular circumstances of the case and notably the nature of the decisions 
to be taken, the question was invoked before the Court whether an individual had 
been involved in the decision-making process to a degree sufficient to provide her 
with the requisite protection of her interests. On this occasion the Court pointed 
the importance of time factor in deciding on pregnancy. It was done through 
reviewing possibilities to make timely decision to terminate pregnancy in order 
to avoid or prevent damage to a woman’s health, which might be occasioned by a 
late abortion. In this case, the Court concluded it had not been demonstrated that 
Polish law as applied to the applicant’s case contained any effective mechanisms 
capable of determining whether the conditions for obtaining a lawful abortion 
had been met in her case.
The access to timely information about the foetus health in the light of the 
mother’s reproductive choice has been addressed in the R.R. v Poland.31 In this case, 
the applicant was denied adequate and timely medical care in the form of prenatal 
genetic examinations, which were prescribed by law in circumstances, which she 
obtained. Such testing would have made it possible to establish whether in her case 
the conditions existed for a lawful termination of pregnancy within the meaning 
of national legislation. Thus, the access to a full and reliable explanation about 
the foetus’ health was not only important for the comfort of the pregnant woman 
but also a necessary prerequisite for a legally permitted possibility. Therefore, 
the denial to adequate and timely medical testing was qualified as breach of 
Article 8 of the Convention (1950). The Court stated that unlawful deprivation of 
medical services proscribed by the law to a pregnant woman was humiliation and 
therefore caused suffering enough to disclose a level of severity falling within the 
scope of Article 3 of the Convention (1950).32
26 Tysiąc v Poland Application No 5410/03 Merits, 20 March 2007
27 R.R. v Poland, Application No 27617/04, Merits, 26 May 2011 at para 200
28 R.R. v Poland, supra n 49 at para 148–162
29 Tysiąc v Poland supra n 48
30 X and Y v. the Netherlands, 26 March 1985
31 R.R. v Poland, supra n 49
32 See R.R. v Poland, supra n 49 at para 161
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In this light we cannot overlook a raising threat of eugenic practices, which 
is inherent in selective abortions. Although the Court has accepted a right to 
access to embryonic screening, Article 8 of the Convention (1950) must not be 
interpreted as providing claimants with right to a genetic healthy child since the 
Court recognized it as a right only when a certain genetic disorder is recognized 
as abortion defence under national statutory (Exter, 2012). It is to bear in mind 
that a different treatment based on disability stands against universal33 and 
regional34 human rights guarantees. Those guarantees could be applicable in 
regard to legal treatment of all members of human race; they refer even to those 
humans in prenatal stage of development. If we consider killing an able body 
foetus at certain point of gestation as actus reus of criminal offence, then killing 
a foetus with abnormality at that gestation is also actus reus of criminal defense. 
Discussions on this issue are not new (Joseph, 2009). There are national legislators 
who are reviewing statutory regulation, which introduced malformation as 
abortion defence (British Parliamentary, 2013). Some other characteristics of the 
unborn have been already recognized at regional level as prohibited for abortion 
or in vitro created embryos destruction (Council of Europe, 2011). Although this 
regional source allows abortion and destruction if there is a potential disability, 
a conceptual novelty is in prohibiting body characteristics (sex) to be taken as 
grounds for it. Apparently, most recent European tendency goes toward limiting 
the operation of foetal malformations (physical or genetic) as abortion defence. 
Such tendency could rather have restrictive effects on access to the negative aspect 
of reproductive choice.
5 CONCLUSION
A temporal framework of reproductive choice, which is recognized by the 
Conventional institutions to be compliant with human right guarantees, is 
reduced to the initial stage of pregnancy. First 18 weeks fall within this stage, 
and pregnancy could be interrupted on the grounds of medical indications and/or 
well-being reasons. National statutory regulation allows pregnancy interruption 
after that stage when exceptional conditions are met. Since in this stage a child 
becomes viable, he/she may survive pregnancy interruption. If it happens, this 
child is entitled for Conventional protection inherent in Article 2 and Article 3 
of the Convention (1950). According to right to life guarantees and supported 
by prohibition against inhumane and degrading treatment, the States have 
obligation to provide life-sustaining treatment or medical care to them. Human 
rights guarantees also require the State to enforce judicial mechanisms against 
the handling medical professional who fails to do so. Such State obligations 
cannot be derogated by parental wishes not to have a child, since their capacity in 
reproductive sphere is reduced to power to reproduce or not to reproduce. More 
precisely, neither of them can be forced to have or not to have a child. However, 
33 The Convention on the rights of Persons with Disabilities, adopted by the General Assembly on 13 December 
2006, and entered into force on 3 May 2008. 
34 See Council of Europe (1979).
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when procreation occurs through natural fertilization, the male partner is not 
afforded with the power to withdraw his consent to reproduction. In symmetry 
to that, the female partner cannot withdraw her consent to reproduce as well, but 
she is accorded with the power to deny her further assistance to life developing 
inside her womb (to detach herself from the unborn) when certain conditions are 
fulfilled. Thereof, neither one of the parents is afforded with the power to decide on 
life of a viable foetus especially when it is ex uterus located. Although the outcome 
of life sustaining treatment or medical care could be uncertain, professional 
interests (which is very arguable in this light since medical professionals are not 
accorded with the power to decide in such manner who is going to live and who 
is not) cannot precedence over the States’ positive obligation in this field. Still, the 
operation of such guarantees in practice depends on parental will as parents are 
accorded with power to invoke judicial proceedings on behalf of their children. 
Because of such procedural requirement, abortion surviving children are deprived 
of Conventional protection.
Next consequence of temporal constraints to reproductive choice concerns 
whether the States maintain fair balance between private life of a pregnant 
woman from one hand and public interest in maternal health safeguarding from 
the other. When the State acting within its limits of appreciation afforded by 
regional human right instruments adopts statutory regulations allowing abortion 
in some situations, access abortion becomes safeguarded under the Convention 
if statutory conditions are fulfilled. Since temporal constraints limit access 
to abortion, simultaneously they require that full and reliable information is 
provided to a pregnant woman enabling her to establish whether in specific case 
the conditions for lawful termination of pregnancy within the meaning of national 
legislation are fulfilled. Therefore, such information is a necessary prerequisite for 
a legally permitted possibility and human rights exercise. Denial of adequate and 
timely medical service, which could provide such information the Court qualified 
as breach of Article 8 and Article 3 of the Convention (1950).
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